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PERMITTING AN UNLICENSED OR
INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE
By TERRENCE A. CALLAN*
T HE law requires that an owner use care in allowing others to
operate his automobile. It seems obviously just to hold him liable if
he entrusts it to a person whom he knows, or should know, to be inex-
perienced, incompetent, reckless or otherwise incapable of operating
an automobile without endangering others.
California has felt the need to hold every owner of a motor vehicle
liable for death or injury to property which results from the negligent
operation of the vehicle by any person operating the vehicle with the
owner's express or implied permission.' This statutory liability is
imposed regardless of any relationship of master and servant or princi-
pal and agent.2 Moreover, liability under section 17150 of the vehicle
code is not dependent upon negligence in the selection of the driver.3
Section 17150 clearly creates a new right of action and has there-
fore been strictly construed.4 Indeed, this liability under the statute
partakes of the nature of a penalty.5 The general necessity, under the
common law, of showing a causal relation connecting the injury com-
plained of, the driver's incompetency, inexperience or unfitness, and
the owner's knowledge thereof, is abrogated by section 17150.6 The
legislative intent in enacting such a statute was to protect innocent third
persons from the careless entrusting of automobiles to others, and to
make this protection paramount to the right of the owner to permit
others to use his car.7
Statutory Elements of Liability
A perusal of section 17150 discloses at once the basic factual condi-
tions upon which it operates to impute liability to the owner for the
negligence of the operator. These elements of liability are ownership,
*Member. Second Year Class.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150.
2 Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. 2d 320, 158 P.2d 393, 159 A.L.R. 1304 (1945); Casey v.
Fortune, 78 Cal. App. 2d 922, 179 P.2d 99 (1947).
Burgess v. Cahill,. 26 Cal. 2d 320, 158 P.2d 393, 159 A.L.R. 1304 (1945).
'Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226. 70 P.2d 183 (1937).
Swing v. Lingo, 129 Cal. App. 518, 19 P.2d 56 (1933).
' Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1937).
Mason v. Russell, 158 Ca]. App. 2d 391, 322 P.2d 486 (1958). For an exhaustive
analysis of the statute and the legislative intent, see Bayless v. Mull, 50 Cal. App. 2d 66,
122 P.2d 608 (1942).
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permission to operate, negligence and damages. The true owner is
responsible, whether he be the registered owner or not.' The burden
of proving the requisite permission is on the plaintiff and is a question
of fact. Unless the burden is met there can be no liability under the
statute.°
An owner's liability to the injured third party is, under section
17150, direct and primary, rather than merely secondary.'" Further-
more, lack of a final judgment against the driver-permitee does not
affect the statutory civil liability of the entrusting owner."
This statutory liability is not, however, limitless. Vehicle Code
section 17151 expressly places a $5000.00 limit on a judgment recover-
able for the death of any one person, a $10,000.00 limit for the death
of two or more persons, and a $5000.00 limit for any property damage
in any one accident where liability is based upon section 17150 and
where there is no principal-agent or master-servant relationship.' 2
Common Law Liability
In addition to statutory liability, the owner of an automobile may
be subject to a common law liability if he entrusts his vehicle to a known.
incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced driver. The principle upon
which this liability rests has been recognized in the Restatement of
Torts'3 which declares that one who supplies chattels to a person he
knows, or should know, to be likely to use such chattels in a manner
involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm to himself or others is
liable for bodily harm caused thereby.
California has recognized the liability of a car owner who entrusts
his car to a known incompetent, reckless or inexperienced driver whether
or not the particular party driving at the time of the accident was within
the scope of the owner's specific consent to use the car.'4
The first California case directly to consider the question was Rocca
8 McClary v. Concord Ave. Motors, 202 Cal. App. 2d 564, 21 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962) ; Rody v.
Winn, 162 Cal. App. 2d 35, 327 P.2d 579 (1958). See also Stoddard v. Pierce, 53 Cal. 2d 115,
364 P.2d 774 (1954) for conclusion that there may be several "owners" at any one time in the
sense of the word owner as used in section 17150 of the Vehicle Code. See also Comment,
28 CAL. L. Rav. 64 (1939).
9 Krum v. Mallow, 22 Cal. 2d 132, 137 P.2d 18 (1943) ; Barcus v. Campbell, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 768, 204 P.2d 65 (1949) ; Irvine v. Wilson, 137 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 843, 289 P.2d
895 (App. Dept., Super. Ct., San Diego, 1955).
'0 Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 256, 44 P.2d 430 (1935).
" Harrington v. Evans, 99 Cal. App. 2d 269, 221 P.2d 696 (1950).
" CAL. VEH. CODE § 17151.
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 390 (1934).
"' MCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. 2d 546, 109 P.2d 358 (1941).
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v. Steinmetz.15 The court reasoned that there was no difference in
principle, but only in degree, between one who entrusts his car to a
person whom he knows to be insane or intoxicated and one whom he
knows, or should know, to be reckless or careless.16 Consideration for
the safety of others, said the court, "requires him to withhold his con-
sent and thereby refrain from participating in any accident that is
likely to happen. ... ""
In the leading case of McCalla v. Grosse,"s the car, though registered
in Grosse's name, was owned by the defendant. Grosse was an aged
and apparently feeble man, eighty years old, with eyesight so defective
that he could not see for a distance of more than twenty-five feet. The
defendant owner lived with Grosse and knew of his poor vision. Never-
theless, he permitted Grosse to drive the car, furnishing funds for gas
and oil. Plaintiff was injured by the negligent driving of Grosse and
alleged Grosse's incompetency, defendant's knowledge thereof, and
defendant's permission that Grosse drive the car. The court upheld the
compaint against a demurrer, stating: "[O]ne who knowingly permits
an unfit driver to use his automobile is liable for damages caused by
the negligent acts of the unfifit driver in the operation of the car."'
19
The reason for holding an owner liable for damage resulting
from entrusting his car to one who is known to be incompetent or in-
capable of operating it seems clear. Liability rests not alone upon the
fact of ownership. Rather, it is the combined negligence of the owner
in entrusting the vehicle to a known incompetent driver, and that of the
driver during its operation.2" The owner can be said to be accountable
because his negligence in entrusting the vehicle to an incompetent
person is deemed to be the proximate cause of any damage done.21
This liability attaches apart from any principle of agency such as
res pondeat suzperior."
" 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923).
'8 Ibid.
Id. at 109, 214 Pac. at 260 (1923).
1842 Cal. App. 2d 546, 109 P.2d 358 (1941).
19 McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. 2d 546, 550, 109 P.2d 358, 360 (1941) ; accord, Easton
v. United Trade School Con. Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 Pac. 597 (1916) ; Hughes v. Wardwell,
117 Cal. App. 2d 406, 255 P.2d 881 (1953) ; Knight v. Grosselin, 124 Cal. App. 290, 12 P.2d
454 (1932) ; Kanananakoa v. Badalamente, 119 Cal. App. 231, 6 P.2d 338 (1931). See also
Note, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 777 (1941).
2' Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684, 214 Pac. 42 (1923).
21 Department of Water and Power of City of Los Angeles v. Anderson, 95 F.2d 577
(9th Cir. 1938) ; 2 BERRY, AUTOMOBILES § 1327 (6th ed. 1929).
22 Knight v. Grosselin, 124 Cal. App. 290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932). See also RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 390, comment b (1934).
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In addition to liability for damages resulting from entrusting an
automobile to a known incompetent driver, there may also be liability
on the owner resulting from the entrusting of his car to an unlicensed
driver. The California Vehicle Code provides that: "No person shall
employ or hire nor shall knowingly permit or authorize the driving of
a motor vehicle, owned by him or under his control, upon the highways
by any person, unless the person is then licensed under this code."23
Violation of this statute has been held to make out a prima facie case
against an owner in favor of a person who has sustained injury through
the negligence of such an unlicensed driver.24 It cannot be assumed,
however, that lack of a driver's license can automatically be equated
with incompetency in driving.25 Such lack of a license, and knowledge
thereof, may nevertheless be held sufficient to put the owner on inquiry
as to the competency of the unlicensed permitee.26 In short, neither
possession nor lack of an operator's license is conclusive evidence that
the defendant was, or was not, a competent driver.27 Lack of a driver's
license may, however, be admissible for consideration in connection
with all other evidence bearing on the question of whether the owner
knew, or was put on inquiry to know, that he was entrusting the opera-
tion of the vehicle to one who was not a competent driver.2"
The key to the common law liability of the owner is whether the
owner knew the driver was unlicensed. Such knowledge would impose
upon the owner the duty of inquiry as to the competency of the driver,29
for in the absence of such knowledge there is no legal duty or obligation
to inquire."0 Then, as seen before, the common law liability of an
owner for entrusting his automobile to an incompetent driver may be
imposed."'
"2CAL. VEH. CODE § 14606. See also CAL. VEH CODE § 14607: "Permitting unlicensed
minor to drive." [Emphasis added.]
" Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Auto Inc., 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931).
2 Ibid.
"Shifflette v. Walkup Drayage Etc. Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 903, 169 P.2d 996 (1946)
But cf. Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal. App. 2d 509, 85 P.2d 160 (1938).
"' Shifflette v. Walkup Drayage Etc. Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 903, 169 P.2d 996 (1946);
Hunton v. Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 684, 123 P.2d 947 (1942).
28 Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Auto Inc., 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931).
"Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal. App. 2d 571, 232 P.2d 531 (1951) ; Shimttette v.
Walkup Drayage Etc. Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 903, 169 P.2d 996 (1946) ; Owens v. Carmichael's
U-Drive Auto Inc., 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931).
" Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Perry v. Simeone, 197 CaL 132,
239 Pac. 1056 (1925) ; Wysoek v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal. App. 2d 571, 232 P.2d 531 (1951).
" See note 19 supra.
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In Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Autos Inc.,32 the gravamen of the
plaintiff's cause of action was the alleged negligence of the owner in
entrusting his automobile to a known incompetent. Defendant's agent,
knowing the driver had only a temporary student permit, nevertheless
permitted him to drive the car. The complaint alleged that the defend-
ant "negligently permitted the driver to drive and operate said auto
upon the highway" and that the defendant knew that said driver was
"not licensed to drive or operate any automobile upon such highway."33
In finding that a sufficient cause of action had been stated, the court
held that defendant's knowledge that the driver possessed merely a
temporary permit (allowing a person to drive only if accompanied by
a licensed driver) was sufficient to put the defendant on inquiry as to
the competency of the driver. It was then for the jury to determine
whether the defendant was negligent34 in permitting the unlicensed
driver to operate the vehicle.
Thus, it seems clear that the owner's knowledge that the driver is a
reckless and careless person is the vital feature in imposing common law
liability on the owner.35 Without a showing of such knowledge, the
lack of a license is apparently immaterial. In the recent case, Johnson
v. Casetta,36 the driver was unlicensed, and had virtually no experience.
There was no proof, however, that the defendants knew this or any facts
from which they should have known of the inexperience or incompe-
tency, or from which they should have been put upon inquiry as to his
competency. Therefore, having no legal duty or obligation to inquire,
there was no common law liability.37
Penal Liability
The general rule is that permitting an unlicensed driver to drive is
not enough in itself to render the owner liable for any injurious conse-
quences aside, of course, from the statutory liability of section 17150.3
This is true even if the owner knew that the driver was unlicensed, if it
be shown that the driver was not incompetent. However, violation of
2 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931).
"Ibid.
Ibid.
Accord, Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Auto Inc., 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580
(1931) ; Ormston v. Lane, 90 Cal. App. 481, 266 Pac. 304 (1928) ; Rocca v. Steinmetz, 61
Cal. App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923).
"6 197 Cal, App. 2d 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1961).
"Ibid.
28 Accord, Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal. App. 2d 571, 232 P.2d 531 (1951) ; Hunton
v. Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 684, 123 P.2d 947 (1942) ; Strandt v. Cannon, 29
Cal. App. 2d 509, 85 P.2d 160 (1938).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
section 14606"0 of the Vehicle Code, which prohibits one from know-
ingly permitting an unlicensed driver to drive his car, is a misde-
meanor.4" As such it is punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months, or
by both fine and imprisonment.41
Thus, even if incompetency of the unlicensed driver-permitee can-
not be established-indeed, even if there is no damage done by the
unlicensed driver-the owner who knowingly permits an unlicensed
driver to drive is nevertheless subject to penal liability. Again it should
be emphasized that, as there can be no civil liability, aside from sec-
tion 17150, unless the owner knows of the incompetency of the driver
(or knows of facts which would lead him to inquire as to competency
as where he knows the driver to be unlicensed) 4" there is no criminal
liability under section 14606 unless the owner knows the driver not to
be licensed.43
In summary, it appears that the owner who permits a known incom-
petent to drive his car is civilly liable for damages resulting therefrom,
either under the owner's liability statute or because of the common law
liability for entrusting the car to a known incompetent. In addition,
he may be criminally liable if it is found that he has entrusted his
automobile to one known to be unlicensed.
The need for recognizing both theories of the owner's civil liability
becomes abundantly clear when it is noted that vehicle code section
17151 limits the damages recoverable from the owner when liability
is based solely upon section 17150."4 The cases, however, seem to
uphold the proposition that when the owner has entrusted his car to a
known incompetent driver the damages recoverable are not limited by
section 17151.45
In Walling v. Ruge 46 the plaintiff joined the car owner as defendant
on the theory of imputed negligence under the car owner's liability
statute, and pleaded a separate cause of action charging the car owner
"' CAL. VEH. CODE § 14606.
40 CAL. VEI. CODE § 40000. See also Annot., 137 A.L.R. 475 (1942) ; 6 CAL. Jun. 2d.
Automobiles § 55 (1952).
1 CAL. VEi. CODE § 42002.
-See note 35 supra.
See Shiflette v. Walkup Drayage & Warehouse Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 903, 169 P.2d 996
(1946) ; CAL. VEI. CODE: § 14606: "No person shall knowingly permit. . . ." [Emphasis
added.] See also, People v. Shapiro, 4 N.Y. 2d 597, 176 N.Y.S.2d 632, 152 N.E.2d 65, 69
A.L.R.2d 973 (1958). (Statute similar to CAL. VYE. CODE § 14606.)
" CAL. VFH. CODE § 17150.
" Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal. App. 2d 957, 212 P.2d 246 (1949); Kanananakoa v.
Badalamente, 119 Cal. App. 231, 6 P.2d 338 (1931).
" 3 Cal. App. 2d 471, 39 P.2d 827 (1935).
?&y, 19631 COMMENTS
with independent negligence on the theory that he deliberately per-
mitted a known incompetent driver to operate his car. The court recog-
nized that one cause of action might be pleaded against the owner under
the statute and another pleaded for negligence in permitting an incom-
petent to drive the car.4" The court rejected the argument that, because
the statute imposed liability on the owner in absolute terms, it would
be error to instruct the jury that the owner might be liable under the
separate theory of independent negligence in permitting an incomptent
driver to drive the car.48
At least one California court has recently gone so far as to hold that
an entrusting owner may be liable for damages to a guest riding with
an incompetent driver where the owner knows of such incompetency.49
This position is based on the theory that there is nothing inherent in
the California guest statute5" which insulates an owner of a vehicle
from his own negligence in entrusting it to a known incompetent driver."
The owner in such a case is not charged with the conduct of the driver
but incurs liability by his dispatching of the vehicle with a known
incompetent driver. 52 The guest statute immunizes the owner where he
would be vicariously liable for the driver's conduct because of the
relationship of the parties, as principal-agent or because of imputed
negligence under section 17150. The statute does not, however, "limit
the common law liability of the owner for his own negligence as
owner."
53
Thus, clearly, the provisions of section 17150 relating to the
primary liability of a non-negligent owner do not release him from
common-law liability for his own negligence such as in lending the
vehicle to a known incompetent or careless driver.54
Conclusion
The policy in California is manifestly oriented toward protecting
the general public against the irresponsible lending and use of automo-
1" Ibid.
"Accord, Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1937) ; Caccamo v. Swanston,
94 Cal. App. 2d 957, 212 P.2d 246 (1949) ; Walling v. Rugen, 3 Cal. App. 2d 471, 39 P.2d
827 (1935).
Nault v. Smith, 194 Cal. App. 2d 257, 14 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961).
o CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158.
5' Nault v. Smith, 194 Cal. App. 2d 257, 14 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961).
5 2 Ibid.
" Nault v. Smith, 194 Cal. App. 2d 257, 268, 14 Cal. Rptr. 889, 896 (1961), quoting
Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 403, 240 P.2d 575, 578 (1952).
" See Harrington v. Evans, 99 Cal. App. 2d 269, 221 P.2d 696 (1950).
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biles. The owner who entrusts his car to another is liable for resultant
damage in the following cases:
1) The owner who expressly or impliedly permits another to drive
his car must answer in damages for any death or injury to property
resulting from negligence in the operation of the vehicle by virtue of
California Vehicle Code section 17150. The only requisites for liability
are ownership and permission, which can be either express or implied.
This liability exists irrespective of any principle of respondeat superior
or negligence in the selection of the driver. The amount of damages
recoverable are, however, limited.
2) The owner is subject to a common law liability for damages
proximately caused by his negligence in allowing an incompetent
operator to drive his automobile. This liability is not limited, nor is it
abrogated, by the statutory liability. The owner must, however, know
or have been put on notice of the driver's incompetency.
3) There may also be a penal sanction for violation of the statutory
prohibition against entrusting an automobile to one who is unlicensed
to drive.
May, 19631 COMMENTS
